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I. INTRODUCTION
In November -1992, at a ceremony celebrating the 40th
anniversary of the Court of Justice of the European Communities,
the President of the European Commission, Mr. Jacques Delors,
praised the Francovich ruling and the effect it will have in
furthering individual rights.' According to Mr. Delors, the
Francovich case gave individuals the right to compensation for any
infringement of Community law for which a Member-State is
responsible.
2




Mr. Delors was referring to the Francovich & Bonifaci v.
Italy ruling handed down by the Court of Justice of the European
Communities on November 19, 1991.3 The Francovich Court held
that the Italian Government was liable for the damage suffered by
Mr. Francovich as a result of its failure to implement Community
Directive 80/987, which is aimed at protecting employees in the
case of their employer's insolvency. 4
The critical importance of the Francovich decision was
immediately perceived by the academic community.5 Even prior to
the ruling, commentators stated that Francovich would finally
ensure that "Community law arrives in Westminster and in all law
courts." 6 Francovich was considered to be of such consequence that
the report prepared by the High-Level Group on the Operation of
the Internal Market urged the European Commission to issue an
penalties under Article 171 of the Maastricht Treaty could haye in protecting an
individual's rights.
3. Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich & Bonifaci v. Republic (Italy), 2
C.M.L.R. 66 (1993) [hereinafter Francovich].
4. Council Directive 80/987/EEC, of October 20, 1980 on the Approximation
of the Laws of the Member-States Relating to the Protection of the Employees
in the Event of the Insolvency of their Employer, 1980 O.J. (L 283/23) 1.
5. Peter Duffy commented that "[ilt is no exaggeration to state that
Francovich takes its place amongst the most important decisions of the Court of
Justice." Peter Duffy, Damages Against the State: A New Remedy for Failure
to Implement Community Obligations, 17 EuR. L. REv. 133, 138 (1993).
6. David Pannick, Swimming Against the Euro Tide, THE TIMES, Aug. 6,
1991. Cases such as Francovich underscore the need for individuals conducting
business in Europe to keep abreast of legal developments in the Community,
Colin Bourn & Allen C. Neal, European Winds of Change, 142 NEw L. J. 1131
(1992). Further, lawyers who fail to advise clients confronted with Francovich
type issues that they might have a cause of action against the State could incur
liability themselves. Sylvia H. Geraghty, ECLaw is Here to Stay, 89 L. Soc'Y.
GAZETTE 23 (1992).
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interpretative document on its implication.7 The need for this
interpretation was regarded by the High-Level Group as one of the
39 steps toward single market harmony.8
The Francovich ruling has generated a great deal of
speculation as to its future significance. Some writers even argue
that the impact of the case could be such that new institutional
structures, such as specialized tribunals for hearings against the
State, should be formed.9 At the same time, other writers warn of
the potential Francovich has in opening the litigation floodgates,
such that limitations on its scope must be developed. For instance,
commentator Peter Duffy argues that it would be an onerous burden
to impose liability on the States "every time an error is made in
implementing Community obligations or when a reasonable
difference exists over their scope."l In fact, it is clear from
Advocate-General Mischo's opinion that he was very concerned
with the number of suits that could arise out of Francovich and he
proposed to limit its retroactive application." Further,
commentators such as Phil McDonnell argue that rigorous
enforcement brought by Francovich could create a chilling effect as
far as potential legislation is concerned.12 Member-States may be
more apt to vote against a proposal if they feel that potential
7. The 39 Steps to Single Market Harmony, THE REUTERS EUR. COMMUNITY
REP., Oct. 29, 1992.
8. Id.
9. Malcolm Ross, Beyond Francovich, 56 MOD. L. REv. 55, 69 (1993).
10. Duffy, supra note 5, at 133. See also Peter Duffy, Can You Sue the State
to Get Your EC Rights?, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 10, 1991.
11. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 105.
12. Phil McDonnell, Member-States Held Financially Liable for Breaches of
ECLaw, LLOYDS LIST, Jan. 3, 1992.
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liability may be incurred for not implementing the legislation.13
The controversy over Francovich's scope stems not only
from abstract ideological differences over the limits of Community
jurisdiction but also from the succinct nature of the Court's ruling.
14
The Advocate-General submitted a comprehensive opinion which
addressed many areas inadequately covered by the Court. The
Advocate-General's opinion and the Court's ruling, however, differ
in important areas such as the standard of liability governing the
actions of the Member-States and the retroactive effect of the
decision. Consequently, the Advocate-General's opinion can only
be used cautiously as an interpretative tool.
1 5
Perhaps Francovich's most important contribution is the
impact it could have on cases where Community directives lack
direct effect because the litigants stand in a horizontal relationship
toward each other. Francovich could be a workable solution to the
inequities caused by the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives.
13. Id.
14. Recognizing the sketchy nature of the court's ruling, former Advocate-
General Sir Gordon Slynn cautioned that, although Francovich could give
enormous backing to Brussels' efforts to police laggard governments, it could
take years to work the details of the ruling. For instance, he pointed out that the
ruling was silent regarding the amount of damages a Member-State could incur,
or whether a Member-State could defend its failure to implement Community law
by arguing justification. David Buchan, Judges Thrust into Battle to Defend
Maastricht Line, FiN. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1992.
15. Although the Advocate-General's submissions are not binding, they are
always considered with great care by the Court and are instrumental in studying
the development of Community law. The duty of the Advocate-General is
spelled out in Article 166 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community which reads in relevant part: "It shall be the duty of the Advocate-
General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open
court, reasoned submissions on cases brought before the Court of Justice, in
order to assist the Court in the performance of the task assigned to it in Article
164." Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [hereinafter EEC
Treaty] art. 166.
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This individual fights problem has been a black eye for the
Community. The effectiveness of Francovich could easily be
diluted if the Court holds that a prerequisite to a finding of liability
is a prior determination of Member-State breach under Article
169.16 Likewise, the protection afforded by Francovich to
individuals claiming rights under directives which lack direct effect
would be eroded if the Court holds that all available remedies must
be exhausted prior to suing the State. To understand these issues,
the evolution of the protection of individual rights bestowed by
Community law must be examined.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF DIRECT EFFECT
A. The Problem With Directives
Article 189 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community empowers the European Communities
Council of Ministers and the Commission of the European
Communities to regulate Member-States through the use of five
different vehicles: regulations, directives, decisions,
recommendations, and opinions.' 7 This Article specifies the scope
of applicability and the binding nature of each vehicle. Regulations
have general application and are binding and directly applicable on
16. Id.
17. Art. 189 of the EEC Treaty states in relevant part:
In order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission
shall, in accordance with the provisions of this treaty, make
regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make
recommendations or deliver opinions. * * *A regulation shall
have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member-States. * * *A directive shall
be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member-
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national
authorities the choice of forms and methods. Id.
[Vol. 3
FRANCOVICH
all Member-States. Directives, on the other hand, are binding on
the Member-State to which they are addressed, but Member-States
can choose the form and method of implementation.18
Directives are a useful legislative tool because they allow
Member-States some flexibility in choosing the methods used to
implement them into national law. The strength of directives,
however, cloaks their weakness. Directives are often not
implemented into national law because Member-States come under
pressure from special interest groups. Frequently they are
inadequately transposed or not transposed on time.' 9 The failure to
implement directives is a widespread problem. The rate of
Member-State non-compliance with their duty to implement
directives is very high and "risks developing into a credibility
problem for the Community.'"° This problem is compounded by
the fact that an individual cannot seek direct redress from the Court
of Justice against a Member-State which has failed to transpose a
directive into national law.2' If the four comers of the EEC Treaty
are examined, the only way an individual can exert pressure upon
a Member-State which has not implemented a directive is indirectly,
through an Article 169 proceeding. Under Article 169, the
18. Labeling an act under one of the Article 189 categories will not stop the
court from examining the substance of the act. The Court will, on occasion,
reject the formal designation of the act and relabel it if necessary. Professor
T.C. Hartley suggests that it is unclear how far the court is willing to engage in
relabeling, and that so far, the Court has limited this practice for the purpose of
determining issues of locus standi. See generally T. C. HARTLEY, THE
FOUNDATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1981).
19. Id.
20. Deirdre Curtin, Directives: The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection of
Individual Rights, 27 COMMON MKT. L REv. 709, 711 (1990).
21. An individual can, however, file a complaint with the Commission alleging
that a Member-State has failed to comply with Community law. Commission
Regulation 26/6, 1992 O.J. (C 224).
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Commission can bring an action against a Member-State before the
Court of Justice if certain cumbersome procedural requirements are
fulfilled3. 2
If the Court finds that a Member-State has failed to fulfill its
Community obligations, the State is required by Article 171 to
comply with the judgment of the Court.23 Article 171, however,
lacks bite. It does not provide the Court with an effective weapon
to discipline a Member-State which fails to implement a directive.
This lack of an effective deterrent "gives directives a dangerously
elastic quality."'24 Article 171, as amended by the Maastricht
Treaty, could go a long way towards making Article 169
proceedings more effective. The Maastricht Treaty reads:
If the Member-State concerned fails to take the
necessary measures to comply with the Court's
judgment within the time-limit laid down by the
Commission, the latter may bring the case before the
22. Article 169 of the EEC Treaty reads:
If the Commission considers that a Member-State has failed to
fulfill an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a
reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned
the opportunity to submit its observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within
the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring
the matter before the Court of Justice.
This procedure is closely related to Article 171, which states that if the Court
finds a Member-State in breach of its Treaty obligations, the State shall be
required to comply with the Court's judgment.
23. For a discussion of the shortcomings of Article 171 proceedings, see
Curtin, supra note 20, at 711-12.
24. Id. at 711. Curtin argues that due to the lack of effective sanctions, a
Member-State can agree to the enactment of a directive knowing that "the price
to pay for possible failure to transpose is non-existent or minimal."
lVoL 3
FRANCOVICH
Court of Justice. In so doing it shall specify the
amount of lump sum or penalty to be paid by the
Member-State concerned which it considers
appropriate in the circumstances. If the Court of
Justice finds that the Member-State concerned has
not complied with its judgment it may impose a
lump sum or penalty payment on it.'
The ineffectiveness of Article 169 proceedings is illustrated
in Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic.Y2
In that case, the Court found that the Italian Government had
breached its duty to implement Directive 80/987, the same
Directive which Mr. Francovich and Mrs. Bonifaci invoked in their
cases against Italy. The Commission v. Italy case played a critical
role in the Francovich decision, and it is necessary to examine it
closelyY
B. The Commission's Proceeding Against Italy
Regarding Directive 80/987
The Italian government failed to implement Directive 80/987
which was aimed at protecting employees in the event of employer
insolvency. The deadline to implement the Directive was October
23, 1983. On April 24, 1985, the Commission sent a letter to Italy
notifying it that it had not complied with the Directive and
requested a response within two months of that date.2 The Italian
government failed to respond, and the Commission, pursuant to
Article 169, issued a reasoned opinion in which it concluded that
25. See Maastricht Texts of the EEC Treaty, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992).
26. Case 22/87, Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic,
1989 E.C.R. 143 (1989).
27. Id. at 164.
28. Id. at 145.
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Italy had not complied with the provisions of the Directive. The
Commission gave the Italian government one month to properly
transpose the Directive into national law.29
Italy argued to the Commission that it was having difficulties
concerning the adaptation of national legislation and that it needed
additional time to implement the Directive. The Commission
declined the request for additional time and took the matter to the
European Court of Justice on January 28, 1987. 30 On February 2,
1989, almost four years after the Commission had notified Italy that
it had failed to implement the Directive, the Court held that Italy
had failed to fulfill its obligations under the EEC Treaty and
ordered it to pay costs. 31 On November 19, 1991, the day the
Court decided the Francovich case, Italy had not yet implemented
the Directive, despite the Article 169 judgment against it almost
three years earlier.
This example of the inadequacy of Article 169 proceedings
is hardly an isolated one. In its "Ninth Annual Report on the
Oversight of the Application of Community Law," the Commission
noted that 83 Court rulings on the implementation of EC law had
been ignored by the Member-States in 1991 alone. 2  The
Commission expressed the view that it expected Francovich would
improve Member-State compliance with Court rulings.33  The
Commission also stated that Article 171, as amended by the
29. Id.
30. Id. at 143.
31. Id. at 144.
32. EUROWATCH, April 17, 1992. Clearly these wholesale violations of
Community law seriously erode the "fundamental principle of a Community
based on the rule of law." See also, Curtin, supra note 20, at 711. 1
33. EUROWATCH, supra note 32.
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Maastricht Treaty, would serve as a powerful enforcement tool.34
However, Article 171 of the Maastricht Treaty is not a panacea for
Member-State non-compliance. As Professor Szyszczak points out,
individuals who have suffered losses are not compensated by Article
171."5 Further, Article 171 proceedings would add a second layer
of protracted procedural prerequisites to the already cumbersome
ones spelled out in Article 169.36
Non-compliance with the Court's rulings is not the only
problem with Article 169 proceedings. The Commission is
overloaded with work, and political reasons often prevent it from
initiating proceedings against offending Member-States, even when
Community law violations are blatant. 37 Further, the Commission's
system of monitoring Member-States' compliance with their duty to
implement Community directives is alarmingly shallow since it does
not examine the substantive content of the State's implementation
measures 38
The inadequate protection of individual fights in Articles
169 and 171 made the Article 177 preliminary reference
proceedings the principal vehicle for protecting Community
bestowed rights. 39 The procedure outlined in Article 177 actively
34. Id.
35. Erica Szyszczak, European Community Law: New Remedies, New
Directions? Joined Cases C-6-90 and C-9-90, Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy,
55 MOD. L. REv. 690, 691 (1992).
36. Bebr, Non-Contractual Liability of the Community, 29 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 557, 582 (1992).
37. Curtin, supra note 20, at 710.
38. Id.
39. Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming Van
Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 105
(1963) [hereinafter Van Gend en Loos].
1995]
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involves individuals and the national courts in the development of
Community law, thereby fostering the concept of the Community
as a participatory system.' ° Under Article 177, a national court
faced with a case involving issues of Community law can request
the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on the matter."
Part of the effectiveness of Article 177 is the fact that ultimately the
national courts decide the case, and governments have a harder time
politically ignoring rulings from their own courts than those from
Brussels. 42 Thus, the Court of Justice, using the Article 177
references from the national courts, developed its jurisprudence of
40. PIERRE PESCATORE, THE LAW OF INTEGRATION 90-92 (1974). Judge
Pescatore argues that the system of cooperation set out in Article 177 between the
European Court and the national courts is the "decisive breakthrough" toward
integration.
41. Article 177 of the EEC Treaty states:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings concerning:
a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of
the Community and of the ECB;
c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an
act of the Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of
a Member-State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that
a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a
court or tribunal of a Member-State against whose decisions
there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or
tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
42. Alan Dashwood, The Principle of Direct Effect in European Community
Law, 16 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 229, 244 (1978). Professor Dashwood
maintains that "the possibility of being sued before a national court provides a
better guarantee of Member-State compliance with Community obligations than
the more remote threat of proceedings under Article 169."
[VoL 3
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individual protection, beginning with the doctrine of direct effect
and culminating with the principle of non-contractual liability as
embodied in Francovich.43
C. The Development of the Doctrine of Direct Effect
To say that a Community provision is directly effective
means that it grants individuals rights which must be upheld in the
national courts, even though the provision has not been
implemented into national law.' Direct effect provides the
individual with a " shield to ward off attempts by a Member-State
to increase restrictions, and a sword to cut down any restrictions
which might remain."45 Aside from giving the individual a role in
the enforcement of Community law, the doctrine of direct effect has
facilitated the creation of a common market by helping to remove
barriers to trade, which aids in the harmonization of national legal
systems and controls anti-competitive behavior. 46 The doctrine of
direct effect was developed by the Court through the Article 177
preliminary reference procedure.
The use of the Article 177 preliminary reference procedure
to determine the propriety of a Member-State's behavior initially
met with resistance from the Member-States. In Van Gend en Loos,
several Member-States charged that Article 177 was being used for
43. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 66.
44. HARTLEY, supra note 18, at 183.
45. Dashwood, supra note 42, at 233. Dashwood also suggests that for the
individual the principle of direct effect not only provides protection but also
provides an enhanced perception of Community law. Id.
46. See id. at 233.
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purposes other than those delineated by the EEC Treaty. 47 In that
case, a Dutch administrative tribunal (the Tariefcommissie) referred
two questions based upon Article 177 to the European Court of
Justice.48 The first question shaped the doctrine of direct effect:
whether Article 12 of the EEC Treaty has an effect within the
territory of a Member-State. In other words, whether, on the basis
of this Article, citizens of the Member-States can enforce individual
rights which the court of the Member-State should protect.49
The Belgian and Dutch governments objected to the referral
on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that Article 177 was being used
to camouflage a complaint by an individual of a Treaty violation.
The governments argued that this bypassed the procedures set out
in Articles 169 and 170 of the EEC Treaty, procedures which did
47. Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcommisssie, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 6;
1 C.M.L.R. 105, 128 (1963). In preliminary rulings, the Commission, the
Government of the Member-States, and the Council (if involved) have the
opportunity of submitting their observations and making oral arguments
regardless of whether they have an interest in the case. These observations are
extremely valuable because they elaborate the facts of the case and present
differing points of view. EEC, art. 20; R.P.CT.JusT., art. 103, 104. See
HENRY G. SCHERMERS AND DENIs WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMuNrrIES 482 (1992); Mortelmans, Observations in the Cases
Governed by Article 177 of the EEC Treaty: Procedure and Practice, 16
COMMON MKT. L. REP. 557 (1979).
48. Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 17. This case involved the
reclassification of ureaformaldehyde for customs purposes which resulted in an
increase in the duty payable on the importation of the product into the
Netherlands. The importer-plaintiff protested the increase on the grounds that
it violated Article 12 of the Treaty. The Francovich case has been termed "the
ultimate consequence of Van Gend en Loos." Bebr, supra note 36, at 583.
49. Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 17. Article 12 of the EEC Treaty
states that "Member-States shall refrain from introducing, as between themselves,
any new customs duties on imports or exports or any charges having equivalent




not provide a mechanism for individuals to complain to the Court
about Member-State non-compliance with Community duties." The
Court disagreed and stated that "the vigilance of individuals
interested in protecting their rights creates an effective control
additional to that entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence
of the Commission and the Member-States. '51  The Court
emphasized that limiting the sanctions for Treaty violations by
Member-States to those procedures in Articles 169 and 170
removed individual rights from direct judicial protection. 2
As to the merits of the question posed in Van Gend en Loos,
the plaintiff and the Commission argued that Article 12 had direct
internal effect within the legal structure of the Member-States.
Consequently, it must be respected by the national authorities even
if not specifically implemented into national law.53  They
maintained that direct effect was the corollary of the structure of the
European Community, which imposed radically different
obligations than those imposed by traditional international
documents or by international customary law. 4
The Dutch, Belgian, and German governments contended
that the Tariefcommissie's question should be answered in the
negative. Their position was based on a literal interpretation of the
text of Article 12 which, according to the governments, only
imposed obligations on Member-States but conferred no rights on
50. Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 6.
51. Id. at8.
52. Id. The Court pointed out that reliance on Article 169 would "risk being
ineffective if it had to be exercised after the enforcement of a national decision
which misinterpreted the requirements of the [EEC] Treaty."
53. Id. at 20.
54. Id.
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individuals. 55 The Court rejected this position and examined the
Tariefcommissie's question in light of the purpose of the EEC
Treaty and the structure of the Community created by it. The
Court concluded that this legal structure involved not only Member-
States but also individuals. 56 In what became the foundation for the
doctrine of direct effect and later the foundation for the Francovich
principle of Member-State liability, the Court stated:
[t]he Community constitutes a new legal order of
international law for the benefit of which the states
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within
certain fields, and the subjects of which comprise
not only Member-States but also their nationals.
Independently of the legislation of Member-States,
Community law therefore not only imposes
obligations on individuals but is also intended to
confer upon them rights which become part of their
legal heritage. These rights arise not only where
they are expressly granted by Treaty, but also by
reason of obligations which the treaty imposes in a
clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon
the Member-States and upon the institutions of the
Community.
In another case, Amministrazione delle Finanze v.
Simmenthal, the Court entrusted the national courts with the
protection of this new legal order created by the Community,
holding that a national court's task is to protect rights conferred





upon individuals by Community law.58  The national courts'
obligation to guard over the fights of individuals became the second
most important foundation for the Francovich principle of Member-
State liability.
D. Horizontal Direct Effect
Van Gend en Loos only established that EEC Treaty
provisions could have direct effect against a Member-State. This
became known as "vertical direct effect." In Defrenne v. Sabena,
the Court faced the question of whether unimplemented Treaty
provisions could impose obligations on individuals; in short,
whether they could have "horizontal direct effect."59 This issue
arose out of an Article 177 reference dealing with Article 119 of the
EEC Treaty which establishes the principle of equal pay for equal
work for both sexes. Ms. Defrenne, an air hostess working for
Sabena, a private company, attempted to receive compensation for
the salary differential between what she and her male counterparts
receivedA0 To this end, she invoked the provisions of Article 119.
The government of Ireland countered by pointing out that the
Court's cases which had found that a provision was directly
effective were limited to the public law sector and did not affect the
private law sphere.6' The United Kingdom argued that allowing
Article 119 to be invoked by one- individual against another was
unfair because it meant imposing obligations on individuals as a
58. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal
S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629, 643; 3 C.M.L.R. 263, 284 (1978) [hereinafter
Simmenthal].
59. Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455; 1 C.M.L.R.
98 (1976) [hereinafter Deftenne].
60. Id. at 457.
61. Id. at 461.
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consequence of the default of a Member-State. According to the
United Kingdom, this would be inconsistent with "normal principles
of equity. ,
62
The Commission agreed with both governments' position
that Article 119 could not create obligations between individuals. 6
Advocate-General Trabucchi, however, rejected this conclusion,
indicating that the purpose of Article 119 was to avoid
discrimination regarding rates of pay, whether it was caused by
laws or regulations of the Member-States, or produced by
individual contracts or collective agreements. 64 The Court, after
examining the purpose of Article 119, held that the "prohibition on
discrimination between men and women applies not only to the
action of public authorities, but also extends to all agreements
which are intended to regulate paid labour collectively, as well as
to contracts between individuals. "65
In both Francovich and Defrenne, the intervening
Governments made subsidiary arguments requesting the Court to
limit the retroactive application of its ruling. This issue merits
discussion as the results in each case were radically different. In
Defrenne, the Irish and British governments argued that the
retroactive application of the judgment could have devastating
results on the economies of the Member-States. 66 The United
Kingdom maintained that "[a] decision attributing direct
applicability to Article 119 could throw the social and economic
62. Id. at 460.
63. Id. at 462-463.
64. Id. at 489.
65. Id. at 476.
66. Id. at 460, 465.
[Vol 3
FRANCOVICH
situation in the United Kingdom into confusion. "67 Likewise, the
Irish Government argued that "to attribute direct effect to Article
119 retroactively would be to impose a burden on the Irish economy
which it is not in a position to support."
68
Advocate-General Trabucchi had no tolerance for these
assertions and stated that "arguments of this kind, however pressing
on grounds of expedience, have no relevance in law." 69 The Court
was more receptive to the governments' entreaties and held that,
with the exception of claims which had been already commenced,
its ruling did not have retroactive applicability.7 The Court agreed
in principle with the Advocate-General's statement that fiscal
matters should have no relevance in judicial decisions. However,
it reasoned that the retroactive application of the judgment would be
an injustice.7' The Court felt that many companies had been led to
believe that by the inaction of the Member-States and the
67. Id. at 460.
68. Id. at 465.
69. Id. at 492. Advocate-General Trabucchi thought that the financial
consequences of this decision would not reach critical proportions because Article
119 is limited exclusively to claims regarding equal pay. This could explain the
difference between his position and that of Advocate Mischo in Francovich.
Unlike Defrenne, the scope of applicability of Francovich could be extremely
broad.
70. Id. at 481.
71. Id. at 480. The Court's limitation of the temporal effect of its ruling has
been criticized as the unwarranted claim to exercise the power not to apply a law
which it recognizes as being valid and legally binding, a power regarded as being
the prerogative of the legislature. Id. Professor Dashwood disagrees with this
criticism and points out that the United States Supreme Court has engaged in this
type of practice in cases such as Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940). Dashwood, supra note 42, at 238.
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Commission, these discriminatory practices were perfectly legal.72
To hold otherwise would violate the principle of legal certainty.73
In Francovich, the tables were turned: the Advocate-
General argued that the Court should limit the retroactive
application of the judgment on considerations of legal certainty.
The Court held otherwise.74 This is especially significant since,
through the years, the number of claims based on Francovich could
exceed those stemming from Defrenne. It is clear that unlike the
private companies in the Defrenne scenario, which arguably were
misled by the inaction of the Member-States and the Commission,
the Member-States in a Francovich scenario have only themselves
to blame for failing to abide by Community law.
In 1986, in the Marshall v. Southampton and South-West
Hampshire Area Health Authority (teaching) case, the Court
weakened the potential significance of Defrenne by holding that
directives could not, unlike Treaty provisions and regulations, have
horizontal direct effect. 75 Arguably, the inequities which resulted
72. Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 480. To the Court, the inaction of the
Member-States was their failure to implement Article 119 into national law. The
inaction of the Commission was its failure to prosecute the laggard States. Id.
73. Id. at 481. The principle of legal certainty is one of the most important
principles recognized by the Court. According to Professor T.C. Hartley, legal
certainty is recognized in most legal systems but "in Community law it plays a
much more concrete role in the form of various sub-concepts which are regarded
as applications of it. The most important of these are non-retroactivity, vested
rights and legitimate expectations." HARTLEY, supra note 18, at 139. For a
discussion of the application of the principle of legal certainty to the field of
equal treatment of the sexes, see A NOY ARNULL, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF EC LAW AND THE INDivIDUAL 225-234 (1990).
74. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 66.
75. Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area




from denying horizontal direct effect to directives were an
important catalyst in the development of the Francovich principle
of non-contractual liability of the Member-States.
76
III. THE LACK OF HoRIzoNTAL DIRECT EFECT OF DIREcTI
A. The Direct Effect of Directives
The issue of whether directives could have direct effect has
been hotly debated in the academic community. This debate
stemmed from the wording and structure of Article 189, which
textually suggests that individuals do not enjoy rights under
directives unless they are transposed into national law.77 Article
189 states that regulations have general applicability and are binding
in their entirety. In contrast, directives are only binding upon the
Member-States to which they are addressed, and they are only
binding as to the results to be achieved. Further, Article 189
specifically states that regulations also enjoy direct applicability,
and is silent as to other forms of secondary legislation.7"
76. See ARNUL, supra note 73, at 255; Anthony Amull, The Direct Effect of
Directives: Grasping the Nettle, 35 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 939 (1986);
SCHERMERS AND WAELBROECK, supra note 47, at 153.
77. See generally Dashwood, supra note 42.
78. Id. Although regulations are usually directly effective there are exceptions.
See opinion of Advocate-General Reischl in Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministerio v.
Ratti, 1 C.M.L.R. 96 (1980). If a regulation is directly effective, national
implementation is impermissible. See Case 50/76, Amsterdam Bulb B.V. v.
Produktschap voor Siergewassen, 1977 E.C.R. 137. In that case the Court
stated:
[Tihe direct application of a Community regulation means that
its entry into force and its application in favour or against those
subject to it are independent of any measure of reception into
national law * * *
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In Van Duyn v. Home Office, the Court held that even
though Article 189 was silent on the matter, directives could have
direct effect.79 The Court buttressed its ruling on the binding effect
of directives and on the principle of effectiveness of Community
law."0 The Court stated that:
where the Community authorities have, by directive,
imposed on Member-States the obligation to pursue
a particular course of conduct, the useful effect of
such an act would be weakened if individuals were
prevented from relying on it before their national
courts and if the latter were prevented from taking it
into consideration as an element of Community
law. 8
1
In later cases such as Pubblico Ministerio v. Ratti' and
[ThereforeI the Member-States may neither adopt nor allow
national organizations having legislative power to adopt any
measure which would conceal the Community nature and
effects of any legal provision from the person to whom it
applies.
79. Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337.
80. Id. The binding nature of directives and the principle of effectiveness of
Community law were concepts that cropped up in Francovich to support the
principle of liability of the Member-States.
81. Id.
82. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. at 1642. In Ratti, the Court stated:
It would be incompatible with the binding effect which Article
189 ascribes to directives to exclude on principle the possibility
of the obligations imposed by them being relied on by persons
concerned * * *
Consequently a Member-State which has not adopted the
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Becker v. Finanzamt Mfinster-Innenstadt,83 the Court reasoned that
the real rationale for the direct effect of directives was based on the
estoppel principle.' This change was precipitated by the desire to
prevent the States from reaping the benefits of their failure to fulfil
their obligations under Community law.' In the Oberkreisdirektor
v. Moormann case the Court rooted the estoppel principle on the
third paragraph of Article 189 and on Article 5, which imposes a
duty of cooperation between the Member-States. 6
B. The Marshall Ruling
The shortcoming of using the estoppel principle as a
rationale for the direct effect of directives was that it failed to
address the question of whether one individual could invoke an
unimplemented directive against another.87 For many years the
implementing measures required by the directive in the
prescribed period might not rely, as against individuals, on its
failure to perform the obligations which the directive entails.
Id. at 110.
83. Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Mfinster-Innenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53, 1
C.M.L.R. 512 (1982).
84. See Sacha Prechal, Remedies After Marshall, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REv.
451, 453 (1990). The shift in emphasis from the principle of effectiveness to the
estoppel principle was the primary reason why the Court decided in Marshall that
directives could not have horizontal direct effect.
85. Id.
86. Case 190/87, Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Borken and Vertreter des
6ffentlichen Interesses beim Oberverwaltungsgericht ffir das Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen v. Handelsonderneming Moormann B.V., 1988 E.C.R. 4689.
87. See A.J. Easson, Can Directives Impose Obligations on Individuals, 4
EuR. L. REv. 67 (1979). This Article examines why directives should or should
not have horizontal direct effect. The main arguments against the horizontal
1995]
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question of whether directives could give rise to horizontal direct
effect lingered. This issue was critical because directives govern a
vast area of relationships between individuals: directives in the
field of equal treatment of men and women; safety at work
directives; company law directives; directives governing the liability
for defective products; and directives relating to the safeguarding of
employee rights in the event of transfer of undertakings or, like in
the Francovich case, in the event of insolvency of their employer.8
Commentators who took the view that directives could
impose obligations upon individuals argued that to give horizontal
direct effect to Treaty provisions but not to directives would lead to
absurdities.8 9 Professor A. J. Easson has illustrated these potential
anomalies by comparing Article 119, which establishes the principle
of equal pay for equal work, with Directive 76/207 which
implements the principle of equal treatment for men and women
direct effect of directives were: (1) Directives are addressed to Member-States.
The counter argument is that Treaty provisions that are also addressed to States
have been found to have horizontal direct effect. (2) The estoppel principle.
According to this principle a State cannot be allowed to plead its own failure to
implement a directive. Therefore, directives can confer rights on individuals only
against the State. Nevertheless, Treaty provisions that impose obligations on
Member-States can give rise to horizontal direct effect. (3) Article 191 of the
EEC Treaty does not require directives to be published in the Official Journal.
In practice, however, directives are always published.
The key arguments in favor of the horizontal direct effect of directives
were: (1) the test to determine whether directives have direct effect is the same
as the one developed for Treaty provisions; (2) to hold that directives may
impose obligations on individuals would increase their effectiveness; and (3) to
hold that directives do not have horizontal direct effect would create anomalies.
See also A.J. Easson, The Direct Effect of Directives, 28 INT'L. COMP. L.Q. 319
(1979); C.W.A. Timmermans, Directives: Their Effect Within the National Legal
System, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 533 (1979).
88. See Prechal, supra note 84, at 451.
89. See A.J Easson, Can Directives Impose Obligations, supra note 87;
SCHERMERS AND WAELBROECK, supra note 47, at 151-53. But see Timmermans,
supra note 87, at 554-555.
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regarding access to employment, vocational training, and
promotion.9 Easson observed that if directives lacked horizontal
direct effect, Directive 76/207 could only be enforced by employees
in the public sector. Meanwhile, Article 119 would apply in both
the public and private sector. Thus, "[i]t would seem absurd to
permit a claim based upon discrimination in respect of pay to be
enforced but to disallow one based upon discrimination as regards
promotion."91
Despite the compelling reasons for granting horizontal direct
effect to directives, the Court ended the academic debate in
Marshall.92 In that case, the United Kingdom maintained that an
unimplemented directive could not be relied upon by one private
party against another.93 The Advocate-General, Sir Gordon Slynn,
agreed. He reasoned that directives could not have horizontal direct
effect because they create obligations on Member-States and not
individuals,94 therefore a "directive comes into play only to enable
rights to be claimed by individuals against the State in default. "
90. See Easson, Can Directives Impose Obligations, supra note 87, at 76
(1979); Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 1976 O.J. (L39/40).
91. Easson, Can Directives Impose Obligations, supra note 87, at 77.
92. Marshall, 1986 E.C.R. at 723.
93. Id. at 727.
94. Id. at 734. See also opinion of Sir Gordon Slynn in Case 8/81, Becker v.
Finanzamt Mfinster-Innenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53, 1 C.M.L.R. 512 (1982).
95. Marshall, 1986 E.C.R. at 734. Sir Gordon Slynn also argued that
directives should not have direct effect because they do not need to be published
in the Official Journal. Id. Article 191 of the EEC Treaty states that
"regulations shall be published in the Official Journal of the Community,"
directives, on the other hand, only "shall be notified to those to whom they are
addressed ...... According to Sir Gordon Slynn's rationale, it would be unfair
to hold individuals responsible for directives which they might not even be aware
19951
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According to Sir Gordon Slynn, if the Court held that directives
could have direct effect, the distinction created by Article 189
between regulations and directives would be rendered
meaningless.96 He also pointed out, rather nonchalantly, that in this
type of situation "if the Member-State is in default it is for the
Commission to proceed under Article 169 of the EEC Treaty." 97
The Court's opinion took an uncharacteristically narrow and literal
interpretation of Article 189.98 The Court stated that.
it must be emphasized that according to Article 189
of the EEC Treaty the binding nature of a directive,
which constitutes the basis for the possibility of
relying on the directive before a national court,
exists only in relation to 'each Member-State to
which it is addressed.' It follows that a directive
may not be relied upon as such against a person.99
The Court and the Advocate-General reasoned in Marshall
that directives could not have horizontal direct effect because the
principle of estoppel does not apply.' A private company, unlike
of. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 735.
98. Id. The Court, unlike the Advocate-General, did not put as much emphasis
on the fact that Article 191 of the EEC Treaty does not impose a publication
requirement for directives.
99. Id. at 749. For later cases supporting this proposition, see Case C-106/89,
Marleasing S.A. v. La Commercial Internacional de Alimentaci6n S.A., 1
C.M.L.R. 305 (1992), and Case 80/86, Criminal Proceedings against
Kolpinghuis Nijmegen B.V., 1987 E.C.R. 3969 (1987).
100. Supra note 95, at 749.
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the government, is not responsible for implementing Community
law, and thus it cannot be said that it is estopped from reaping the
benefits of failing to implement Community law."0 '
The abnormalities created by the Marshall decision probably
have played an important role in the development of the principle
of Member-State liability framed in Francovich.'0 2
C. The Marshall Anomalies
Many commentators feel that the Marshall holding resulted
in "serious and inequitable consequences for the enforcement by
individuals of their Community law rights," 03 and that "the rights
of the individual and the requirements of legal certainty would have
been better served had the Court accepted that directives were
capable of producing horizontal direct effect. '"'04  Professor
Anthony Arnull sharply criticized the Court's rationale that
directives could not give rise to horizontal direct effect because the
language of Article 189 made directives binding only on Member-
States. He argued that in Van Gend en Loos the Court had faced,
and rejected, similar arguments narrowly rooted in the language of
a Treaty provision.'0 5 In that case the Court focused on the
101. Id.
102. See ARNULL, supra note 73, at 255; Arnull, The Direct Effect of
Directives, supra note 76; Prechal, supra note 84, at 472-73; SCHERMERS AND
WAELBROECK, supra note 47, at 153.
103. Prechal, supra note 84, at 451. Prechal argues that "notwithstanding the
liberal application of the concept of direct effect by the Court of Justice, the fact
remains that Marshall causes some anomalies and tensions". Id. at 456. See also
HARTLEY, supra note 18, at 209.
104. Arnull, supra note 76.
105. Id. at 944.
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effective functioning of the Community system and not on linguistic
nuances. 
106
The Marshall opinion was bitterly criticized because of the
artificial distinctions it created between individuals who worked for
the State and those who worked for private companies. 7 It
appeared arbitrary that individuals could or could not assert rights
granted to them by Community directives depending on the
classification of their employer. These issues were further
complicated by the thorny problem of determining who was a state
or a private employee for the purposes of deciding whether a
provision could give rise to direct effect." 8 Another disrupting
effect of Marshall was the possibility that Member-States could be
subjected to pressure from special interest groups trying to delay the
implementation of directives. This would expose Member-States to
Article 169 proceedings, but in view of the inadequacy and
protracted nature of these actions a State could easily yield to
106. Id. In Van Gend en Loos, the Court rejected the argument of the Dutch
Government that since Article 12 of the EEC Treaty was addressed to Member-
States, it conferred no rights on individuals. See generally, Van Gend en Loos,
1963 E.C.R. 1.
107. ARNULL, supra note 73, at 254. Arnull maintains that:
[Tihe view taken by the Court in Marshall of the circumstances
in which directives are capable of producing direct effect
means that the rights of the individual may now depend solely
on the status of the organization against which he or she seeks
to enforce them. This seems a wholly arbitrary distinction.
Id. at 254.
108. Prechal, supra note 84, at 457-62.
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powerful lobbies.' 0 9 It was clear that an adequate substitute for the
denial of horizontal direct effect of directives had to be found.110
D. Seeking Solutions to Marshall
Marleasing S.A. v. La Comercial Internacional de
Alimentaci6n S.A. corrected some of the anomalies generated by the
Marshall ruling."' This case arose in the context of a dispute
between Marleasing S.A. and La Comercial Internacional de
Alimentaci6n .112 La Comercial was incorporated by three entities
including the Company Barbiesa S.A. Marleasing, a creditor of
Barbiesa, argued that La Comercial was created to put Barbiesa's
assets outside the reach of its creditors and sought a declaration of
nullity of La Comercial's founding contract under the Spanish Civil
Code based on lack of lawful cause." 3 La Comercial argued that
the First Council Diredtive 68/151, which had not been transposed
into Spanish law, listed exhaustively the situations when nullity of
a company could be declared and that lack of cause was not one of
those grounds." 4 The Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucci6n
at Oviedo, requested from the Court a preliminary ruling on the
direct effect of this Directive. 
115
109. ARNuLL, supra note 76, at 944.
110. ARNULL, supra note 73, at 254.
111. Case C-106/89, Marleasing S.A. v. La Comercial Internacional de
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The Court reiterated that directives could not have horizontal
direct effect." 6 However, it held that national courts were under
the duty to interpret national law in light of the purposes, goals, and
wording of the particular directive which governed the subject
matter of the litigation. This was the case regardless of whether the
national law was passed prior or subsequent to the directive in
question. 7 Through this technique of construction, a national court
could give effect indirectly to a directive which lacked direct
effect. 8 This came to be known as indirect effect.
The principle of indirect effect can be traced to Von Colson
and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen."9 In that case, Ms.
Von Colson was denied employment at a prison for reasons relating
to her gender. The German court hearing her case found that she
had been discriminated against, but invoked a German law, which
purported to implement Directive 76/207, to limit her damages to
the travel expenses she incurred for the purposes of the job
interview."10 When the case was referred to the Court of Justice, it
116. Id. at 322. The Court, noting its ruling in Marshall, stated:
[wlith regard to the question whether an individual may rely on
the directive against a national law, it should be observed that,
as the Court has consistently held, a directive may not of itself
impose obligations on an individual and consequently, a
provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such against
such a person. Id. at 322.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 322-323.
119. Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984
E.C.R. 1891, 1 C.M.L.R. 430 (1986) [hereinafter Von Colson].
120. Von Colson, 1984 E.C.R., at 1894.
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held that a Member-State's obligation to achieve the results of a
directive is binding on all authorities of the Member-State including
the Courts. 121 The Court then stated:
in applying the national law and in particular the
provisions of a national law specifically introduced
in order to implement Directive No. 76/207,
national courts are required to interpret their national
law in the light of the wording and the purpose of
the directive in order to achieve the result referred to
in the third paragraph of Article 189.1'
Consequently, to give effect to the purpose of Directive No.
76/207, the compensation given to Ms. Von Colson had to be
adequate in relation to the damage she suffered, and not merely
nominal.
Although the protection afforded by the principle of indirect
effect can produce results similar or even equivalent to direct effect,
it is limited by the flexibility of the national provision in question, 'I
the discretion left to the national courts and by general principles of
121. Id. at 1909.
122. Id. The question as to how far national courts can go in using directives
as aids in the interpretation of national law is not clear. The Court in Case
80/86, Criminal Proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen B.V., 1987 E.C.R.
3969, 3970 (1987) [hereinafter Kolpinghuis], held that the obligation of a
national court to refer to the content of a relevant directive when it is interpreting
its national law is limited by the principle of legal certainty and non-retroactivity.
Therefore, independent of national legislation, a directive cannot "have the effect
of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law of persons who act in
contravention of the provisions of that directive."
123. Such as the principle of legal certainty and non-retroactivity discussed in
Kolpinghuis. Id.
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community law.12 4 The principle of indirect effect has been
perceived as being too dependent on the willingness and capacity of
the national court to identify its Community obligation."z
Arguably, the principle of indirect effect leaves the protection
offered by Community directives "to rest solely on the correctness
and enthusiasm of national courts in developing their national
laws. "126 Further, this enthusiasm will vary not only between the
courts of the different Member-States but between the different
courts in one State. In light of this, the possibility of imposing
liability on the Member-States for damages stemming from their
failure to implement directives was debated. 27 Professor Henry
Schermers stated that:
[i]n order to avoid a difference in treatment of the
individuals who want to invoke a directive against
the State and those who want to invoke it against
other citizens, the most elegant solution is probably
to declare that Member-States are liable to the
injured party if damage has been caused through an
infringement of Community law.'28
124. Prechal, supra note 84, at 469. See Kolpinghuis, 1987 E.C.R. at 3987.
125. Ross, supra note 9, at 56.
126. Id. at 57. See also Szyszczak, supra note 35, at 696; ARNULL, supra note
73, at 255.; Arnull, The Direct Effects of Directives, supra note 76, at 945-46.
127. Prechal, supra note 84, at 466-468. The theoretical basis for imposing
damages on the State for the failure to fulfill its obligations had been examined
in the literature prior to Francovich, see e.g., Amy Barav, Damages in the
Domestic Courts for Breach of Community Law by National Public Authorities,
in NON-CONTRACTUAL LTABILTY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 149 (Henry B.
Schermers et al., eds., 1987); Curtin, supra note 20, at 729-737.
128. See SCHERMERS AND WAELBROECK, supra note 47, at 153.
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In the same vein, Sacha Prechal pointed out that:
[i]t is quite conceivable that, if it appears from a
preliminary ruling or from a subsequent national
judgment that a Member-State has not or has not
correctly implemented a directive, an individual,
who can not successfully bring a case against his or
her private counterpart in consequence of Marshall,




Mr. Francovich was employed with an Italian company
which went bankrupt and owed him part of his salary. He instituted
proceedings against his former employer before the Pretura di
Vicenza, and was awarded a judgment of six million lire. The
judgment could not be enforced, due to the insolvency of the
company. Mr. Francovich relied on Directive 80/987 in an attempt
to obtain from the Italian government the guarantees and ancillary
compensation the Directive provided. Similarly, Mrs. Bonifaci and
33 other employees were owed over 235 million lire by their
insolvent employer. They brought proceedings in the Pretura di
Bassano del Grappa against the Italian government, based on
Directive 80/987, for payment of their outstanding salary, or for
compensation for the damages they sustained due to Italy's failure
to implement the Directive. In both cases, the national courts
referred three identical questions to the European Court, and the
129. Prechal, supra note 84, at 466.
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cases were joined. 3 ° The Court only responded to the first question
which read:
Under Community law in force, can an individual
who has suffered as a result of the failure by the
State to implement Directive 80/987, which failure
has been established by a judgment of the Court of
Justice, require that State to comply with those
provisions contained in it which are sufficiently
precise and unconditional by relying directly on the
Community rules against the Member-State in
default in order to obtain the guarantees which that
Member-State has to ensure, and, in any event, is he
entitled to claim damages suffered in respect of
provisions which do not have that status?13'
While the first part of this question asked whether certain
provisions of the Directive were directly effective, the second part
dealt with the broader sweeping issue of whether Member-States
could be financially liable for damages arising out of their failure
to implement directives even if they lacked direct effect. Advocate-
General Mischo put the aggravated nature of this case in perspective
when he lamented that "rarely has our Court had to give judgment
in a case where the loss caused to the individuals concerned by a
failure to implement a directive has been as scandalous as here."1
3 2
The Court of Justice in the Commission v. Italy case found the
Italian Government in violation of its EEC Treaty obligations due
to its failure to implement Directive 80/987. Several years later, at
130. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 66.
131. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 74.
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the time of the Francovich hearings before the European Court,
Italy had taken no steps to comply with the Commission v. Italy
ruling, and Directive 80/987 remained unimplemented.133
B. The Lack of Direct Effect of Directive 80/987
For a directive to be directly effective, it must be clear and
unconditional and must not leave normative discretion to the
Member-States.134 To determine whether Directive 80/987 was
sufficiently clear and unconditional to give rise to direct effect, the
Court examined three aspects of its provisions: the determination of
the Directive's beneficiaries, the content of the Directive's
guarantee, and the identity of the institutions liable for that
guarantee.
The determination of the Directive's beneficiaries is
addressed in Article 1(1) which reads: "this Directive shall apply to
employees' claims arising from contracts of employment
relationships and existing against employers who are in a state of
insolvency within the meaning of Article 2(1). ,135 The Court held
133. Id. at 73.
134. Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office 1974 E.C.R. 1337. This test
applies to directives as well as all the other regulatory vehicles listed in Article
189.
135. Council Directive 80/987, 1987 O.J. (L 283) 2. Article 2(1) specifies the
criteria to determine when an employer is considered to be in a state of
insolvency. Italy argued that Francovich could not rely on the Directive because
it was unclear that his former employer was formally declared insolvent.
According to Advocate-General Mischo Italy's argument was irrelevant because
that determination had to be made by the national courts.
Article 2(2) refers to national law for the definitions of employer and
employee. Article 1(2) gives the Member-State the discretion to exclude from the
coverage of this Directive certain categories of employees which were set out in
the Annex to the Directive. Under this Annex, Italy could only exclude two
classes of employees: (1) employees already protected by law from economic
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that this provision determined sufficiently precisely and
unconditionally who could be considered a beneficiary under the
Directive. 36
As far as the content of the Directive's guarantee, Article 3
provided that the Member-State had to ensure payment of
employees' outstanding claims resulting from contracts of
employment or employment relationships. Although the Directive
gives the Member-States some discretion in selecting the way in
which the guarantee payment is to be calculated, 37 or in reducing
its amount,1 38 the Court stated that a "minimum guarantee" could be
calculated. This minimum guarantee could be computed by
referring to the option which implied the least financial burden for
the guarantee institution. As far as the content of the guarantee, the
provisions of the Directive were sufficiently precise and
unconditional.
The determination of the identity of the guarantee institution
under Directive 80/987 was a much more complicated question
which ultimately blocked the direct effect of the Directive. The
critical provision was Article 5(B) which states: "employers shall
contribute to financing (the guarantee institution), unless it is fully
crisis, and (2) crews of sea going vessels.
136. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 77 (1993).
137. Council Directive 80/987, 1987 O.J. (L 283) 3. Article 3(2) of the
Directive gave the Member-States three choices from which to determine the
beginning of the guarantee institution's obligation: (1) at the onset of the
employer's insolvency; (2) at the time of the notice of dismissal issued to the
employee; or (3) at the time the contract of employment or employment relation
was discontinued.
138. Council Directive 80/987, 1987 O.J. (L 283) 4. Article 4(1) and 4(2) gave
the Member-States the option to limit the liability to periods of 3 months or 8
weeks according to certain methods set out in that Article. Article 4(3) allows
a Member-State to set a ceiling of liability in order to avoid the payment of sums
exceeding the social objectives of the directive.
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covered by the public authorities. "139 The Commission maintained
that this section provided for the possibility that the public
authorities would fully cover the financing of the guarantee
institutions, and, therefore, the Member-State could not deny the
direct effect of the Directive by alleging that it could have required
others to bear the financial obligation imposed upon it. The Court
disagreed with the Commission and held that the obligation to
award the payments rested not with the Member-State, but with the
guarantee institution. According to the Court, the fact that the
public authorities could decide to cover in full the financing of the
system did not mean that the Member-State could be identified as
the institution liable for the outstanding payment. "'
The Court concluded that individuals could not rely on the
rights conferred by Directive 80/987 in proceedings against the
State before national courts. The Court then moved to the second
part of the first question posed by the Italian courts: the issue of
Member-State liability for failure to implement a directive. The
EEC Treaty provides for the non-contractual liability of the
Community institutions, but is silent regarding Member-State
139. Council Directive 80/987, 1987 O.J. (L 283) 5. The remainder of Article
5, which embodies the identity of the guarantee institution, reads:
Member-States shall lay down detailed rules for the
organization, financing and operation of the guarantee
institutions, complying with the following principles in
particular:
(A) The assets of the institutions shall be independent of the
employers' operating capital and be inaccessible to proceedings
for insolvency.
(C) The institutions' liabilities shall not depend on whether or
not obligations to contribute to financing have been fulfilled.
140. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 82.
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liability.'41 Therefore, if such a principle was to develop, it was to
be developed as judge-made law. 42 The Court had been confronted
with the issue of non-contractual liability of Member-States in the
Enichem Base v. Commune Di Cinisello Balasamo case. 3
However, since the Directive in the Enichem case lacked direct
effect, the Court declined to examine the question of the financial
liability of the Member-States." If the Court had followed that
reasoning in Francovich, it would have ended its analysis when it
decided that Directive 80/987 lacked direct effect.
C. The Foundation of Member-State Liability
1. The Commission
The Commission supported Mr. Francovich's liability claim
but suggested that the Court should focus on the Directive in
question and refrain from issuing a principle of general
141. Art. 215 of the EEC Treaty states in relevant part:
In the case of non-contractual liability, the Community shall,
in accordance with the general principles common to the laws
of the Member-States, make good any damage caused by its
institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.
142. See Bebr, supra note 36, at 571.
143. Case 380/87, Enichem Base v. Commune Di Cinisello Balasamo, 1989
E.C.R. 2491 [hereinafter Enichem].
144. A possible difference between Francovich and Enichem is the fact that
Directive 80/987, although lacking direct effect as whole, did create rights for
the benefit of employees. On the other hand, the Directive in Enichem did not
give rise to any rights for individuals. Barav, supra note 127. See also
Szyszczak, supra note 35, at 697.
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applicability. 14 In fact, at the hearing, the Commission stressed
that the Court should not address the general question of whether
the failure to implement a directive which does not have direct
effect may give rise to liability.146 It is unclear why the
Commission took such a narrow position. Perhaps the Commission
felt that formulating a general principle of liability would upset the
delicate working balance between the Member-States and the
Community Institutions. Or perhaps the Commission was acting
out of self interest and was fearful that an expansion of the doctrine
of liability might in turn ease the strict standards necessary to prove
liability on the part of the Community Institutions. Another
explanation for the Commission's timid approach to the question: of
State liability is that it may have wanted to focus on having
Directive 80/987 declared directly effective. It is clear from the
Commission's argument that it did in fact make a very strong pitch
to the Court to have this Directive held as directly effective. The
rationale behind this hypothesis was that if Directive 80/987 were
directly effective it would result in an expansion of the doctrine of
direct effect. In fact, the Court's holding that the content of the
rights spelled out in this Directive was clear and unconditional has
been considered an important extension to the principle of direct
effect in and of itself.
147
145. See Szyszczak, supra note 35, at 694.
146. The Commission's approach toward Francovich has been schizophrenic.
Although the Commission urged the Court to contain the scope of the Francovich
ruling, once the case was decided, the President of the Commission hailed the
ruling as a cure for Member-State non-compliance with their Community
obligations. EC: Court of Justice Celebrates 40th Anniversary, supra note 1.
147. See Bebr, supra note 36, at 571.
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2. The Advocate-General
Whatever the reasons the Commission had for taking such
a narrow position, Advocate-General Mischo attacked it vigorously.
He argued that "one cannot avoid the need to decide once and for
all, that is to say, not just in the context of this case, whether
Member-States can be held liable for their failure to implement a
directive., 148 Next, the Advocate-General proceeded to examine the
submissions of the governments which intervened. 49 The Italian,
British, and German governments maintained that Community law
offered no basis for the principle that States could be liable to
individuals for losses due to the non-implementation of directives. 50
The crux of the Member-States' position was that the determination
of their liability was a matter of national law and not Community
law. They argued that the Court's case law had left it up to the
national courts to determine the methods and procedures that
governed a liability claim against a Member-State. Consequently,
the principles which govern whether a liability action existed should
be determined by national law and not Community law."'
To support their position, the intervening Governments
pointed to the Russo case, in which the Court stated: "if damage
has been caused through an infringement of Community law, the
State is liable to the injured party for the consequences in the
148. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R at 84.
149. Id. at 85.
150. See Case 60/75, Carmine Antonio Russo v. Azienda di Stato per gli
Interventi sul Mercato Agricolo, 1975 E.C.R. 47 [hereinafter Russo]. In
Francovich, the Dutch Government argued that a Member-State could be liable
under Community law for the failure to implement a directive, but since there
was no Community legislation on the matter, it was up to a national judge to
decide whether liability existed according to national law. 2 C.M.L.R. 66.
151. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 86-87 (emphasis added).
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context of the provisions of national law. 152 The Advocate-General
argued that the Member-States were reading this sentence out of
context, since Russo made it clear that the Member-States have to
take responsibility for the damage suffered by individuals stemming
from their breaches of Community law.153
The Advocate-General based the principle of Member-State
liability on the principle of effective protection of Community
bestowed fights and on the obligation of the Member-States to
ensure the full effectiveness of Community law. Advocate-General
Mischo reasoned that the national courts are under the duty to
effectively protect Community rights of individuals. This
obligation extends to providing an adequate remedy for Community
law violations even in those situations where, as in the Regina v.
Secretary of State for Transport, exparte: Factortame Ltd. case, the
national courts lack the power to grant such a remedy. 54 This
means that if "payment of compensation is the sole means in the
particular circumstances of ensuring effective protection, the
Member-State is under an obligation by virtue of Community law
152. Id. Advocate-General Mischo argued that in light of the question posed by
the national court in Russo, the Court would have indicated in clear terms if it in
fact intended to leave it up to the national courts to establish the principles
determining whether actions in damages for breaches of Community law could
lie against the State. Id.
153. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 87.
154. Case C-213/89, Regina v. Secretary for Transport, ex parte: Factortame
Ltd, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2466. In Factortame, the House of Lords found that if the
plaintiffs were not granted interim relief from the application of an English Act
designed to stop "quota jumping" by Spanish vessels, they would suffer
irreparable damage. Interim relief was denied based on an old common law rule
which stated that this type of relief could not be granted against the Crown and
because Acts of Parliament were presumed to be valid. On an Article 177
reference, the European Court held that if a national court deciding a matter of
Community law considers that it is prevented by a national rule from granting
interim relief, it must set that rule aside.
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to make available to individuals an appropriate remedy enabling
them to claim compensation."' 55
The Advocate-General emphasized in his opinion that a
Member-State deprives Community law of its intended effect
particularly when it fails to implement directives which do not have
direct effect. Individuals who are bestowed rights under this type
of directive are in a very precarious situation. The only protection
they may be able to secure is through the uncertain principle of
indirect effect. The Advocate-General stated that in situations
where directives confer rights on individuals, but are not directly
effective, "the basic requirement that Community law be applied
uniformly would at least be respected in part if individuals deprived
of their rights by [the Member-State's] failure to implement a
directive could recover compensation in an approximately
equivalent amount."156 The Advocate-General's rationale clearly
encompasses those cases where an individual cannot invoke an
unimplemented directive because the opposing party is a private
party. Thus, the principle of Member-State liability would afford
protection to those individuals who, due to the lack of horizontal
direct effect of directives, cannot invoke rights granted by a
directive against another one. The Advocate-General's opinion
appears to indicate that Francovich could solve many of the
problems generated by Marshall's denial of horizontal direct effect
of directives.
155. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 86. The Advocate-General also based the
principle of Member-State liability on the obligation States have to ensure that
Community law is fully effective. This obligation, in turn, is rooted in the same
EEC Treaty provisions as the foundation for the direct effect of directives: the
principle of cooperation spelled out in Article 5 and in the third paragraph of
Article 189 which states that a directive is binding and obliges a Member-State
to carry it out.




The Court's portion of the opinion dealing with State
liability is remarkably short and sweeping. The Court, citing to the
Van Gend en Loos case, discussed the new legal order created by
the EEC Treaty which imposed obligations on Member-States as
well as individuals and conferred rights on the latter. These rights
were not only derived from the textual provisions of the EEC
Treaty, but also from its purpose and spirit. The Court then
referred to the duty imposed on national courts in Simmenthal to
protect the rights individuals derive from the legal order created by
the EEC Treaty. According to the Court the effective protection of
individuals would be "undermined if individuals were not able to
recover damages when their rights were infringed by a breach of
Community law attributable to a Member-State."
157
To support the principle of Member-State liability, the Court
also invoked the principle of cooperation found in Article 5, and the
obligation Member-States have under the third paragraph of Article
189, to take all necessary steps to achieve the results required by a
directive. The Court concluded that "the principle of State liability
for damages to individuals caused by a breach of Community law
for which it is responsible is inherent in the scheme of the
Treaty. "158
D. The Conditions of State Liability
1. The Advocate-General
The Advocate-General and the Commission took the position
that the financial liability of the Member-States should be measured
by the same standards as those governing the Community
157. Id. at 114.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
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institutions.159 The standard of liability he favored is extremely
difficult to meet. Community non-contractual liability attaches only
if there has been a sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of
law for the protection of the individual, and the institution
concerned manifestly and gravely disregards the limit on their
powers."6 It is easy to see that only a few claims can satisfy this
high standard. In addition, this standard is difficult to apply.
Questions arise as to what exactly is a "sufficiently serious breach;"
what is a "superior law for the protection of the individual;" and
what exactly constitutes a "manifest disregard" of power.
To make his position more palatable, the Advocate-General
stated that when the Court holds in an Article 169 proceeding that
a State has failed to implement or has incorrectly implemented a
directive, the State can be considered as having infringed a
fundamental rule of the EEC Treaty. 61  From the standpoint of
trying to remedy the inequities stemming out of Marshall's denial
of horizontal direct effect, this would be fatal. Not only is the
159. The section of the Advocate-General's opinion dealing with the conditions
of Member-State liability has been criticized for its lack of cogency as well as for
proposing a standard of liability that is very difficult to meet. See Bebr, supra
note 36, at 565; John Temple Lang, New Legal Effects Resulting From the
Failure of States to Fulfill Obligations Under European Community Law: The
Francovich Judgment, 16 FORDHAM INTER. L. J. 2, 18 (1993).
160. See Szyszczak, supra note 35, at 695: "under this head of liability very few
claims have been met as a result of the proviso added to the wording of Art. 215
EEC by the Court, that liability will only arise where there has been a flagrant
breach of a superior rule of law designed to protect the individual." For the text
of Art. 215 see EEC Treaty, supra note 141.
161. See Lang, supra note 159, at 18. The Advocate-General then seems to
change his mind and argues that the failure of a State to implement a directive
cannot be compared with the Community Institutions acting in a legislative
capacity. This contradicts the test he put forth initially. After this change of
heart, it is difficult to even discern what test the Advocate-General espoused.
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Advocate-General's test too difficult to meet, but its alternative, to
have to wait for an Article 169 ruling, would create delays with
consequent strains on financial resources. This would effectively
deter many potential Francovich-plaintiffs from pursuing a claim of
damages against the State.
2. The Court
The Court did not impose the strict conditions recommended
by the Advocate-General.' 62 Instead, the Court fashioned a three-
pronged test:
the first of these conditions is that the result required
by the Directive includes the conferring of rights for
the benefit of the individuals. The second is that the
content of these rights may be determined by
reference to the provisions of the Directive. Finally,
the third condition is the existence of a causal link
between the breach of the obligation of the State and
the damage suffered by the persons affected. 163
The Court and the Advocate-General also disagreed as to
Francovich's retroactive application. The Italian government had
asked the Court to limit the retroactive application of its ruling.
Advocate-General Mischo agreed with Italy, fearing that the range
of applicability of the case could be extremely broad. According to
Advocate-General Mischo, Francovich could result in an
overwhelming number of claims creating extremely serious
162. Interestingly, the conditions of liability imposed on the Member-States are
easier to meet than those of the Community institutions when the Treaty
specifically provides for the non-contractual liability of the latter, but not of the
former. This bears witness to the enormous creative power of the Court.
163. See Szyszczak, supra note 35, at 695. Szyszczak praises the Court for not
shrouding the Member-States with the protective veil fabricated by the Advocate-
General.
19951
46 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
financial consequences for the Member-States. The Advocate-
General pointed out that prior to Francovich, the issue of State
liability was uncertain and therefore the Member-States could have
reasonably believed that their liability would be entirely governed
by national law. In light of this, he believed that the retroactive
application of the ruling should be limited.164 The Court, however,
disregarded the Advocate-General's advice and did not limit the
retroactive effect of this ruling.
E. Francovich: The Solution to Marshall's Denial of
Horizontal Direct Effect of Directives
Francovich could be the solution to the anomalies created by
Marshall's denial of horizontal direct effect of directives. Mr.
Francovich was able to sue a Member-State for damages he
sustained at the hand of another individual due to the non-
implementation of Directive 80/987. This was the case regardless
of the fact that, due to the lack of horizontal direct effect of
directives, he could not invoke the Directive against his employer.
The Court noted that individuals claiming rights from a directive
which lacked direct effect merit special protection:
the possibility of obtaining damages from the State
is particularly indispensable where, as in this case,
the full effectiveness of Community rules is subject
to prior action on the part of the State, and
consequently individuals cannot, in the absence of
164. The Advocate-General also argued that it could have been reasonable for
Member-States to believe that they were not liable for the failure to implement
Directives which lacked direct effect.
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such action, enforce the rights granted to them by
Community law before the national courts. 65
The Advocate-General wondered whether a Member-State
could incur financial liability where a private party has to suffer
loss vis-t-vis another due to the State's failure to implement a
directive. The Advocate-General stated:
After all, in this case the State is only responsible
for the failure to implement the Directive and not for
the facts which are the direct cause of the damage
suffered by the citizen, such as, for example, the
non-payment of salary, the insufficient remuneration
of a female employee, or the defective nature of a
pro duct. 166
Dr. Barav speculates that one of the most important
consequences of Francovich is that it will fill the void left by
Marshall's denial of horizontal direct effect of directives.167 This
position is also espoused by Professor Malcolm Ross.168 Likewise,
commentator Daniel Preiskel stated that the:
165. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 114. This stateijent is echoed by Ross, supra
note 9, at 60, who comments that "the clearest value of the remedy provided in
Francovich is where the interest of the individual would not be protectable by
other means; it thus provides a new weapon where direct effect is lacking."
166. Francovich, 2 C.M.L.R. at 99. The Advocate-General points out that in
cases where an unimplemented directive imposes obligations on a Member-State,
or a body which must be treated as such, the State commits two faults: it fails to
implement the directive and simultaneously fails to observe the obligations
imposed by the directive.
167. Barav, supra note 127.
168. Ross, supra note 9, at 58.
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Francovich Judgment now means that any private
party who has suffered loss vis-A-vis another third
party as a result of a State's failure to implement a
Directive or indeed any other breach of Community
law, may recover this loss not by suing the third
party, but by way of judicial review against the
State. 1
69
F. Exhaustion of Remedies
An issue which was not addressed by the Court or the
Advocate-General was whether a potential Francovich-plaintiff must
exhaust local remedies prior to suing the State for damages. In
particular, it is unclear what the relationship is between the
Francovich principle of State liability and a national court's
obligation to interpret national legislation in light of the purposes of
a directive. 7 ' The proponents of the argument that national
remedies must be exhausted point to the Court's statement that
obtaining damages against the State is particularly important when
individuals cannot enforce their Community rights in the national
courts. Thus, if an individual has an alternative remedy, he ceases
to be part of this protected class and must exhaust other remedies
prior to suing the State for damages. The advocates of this position
maintain that where defective or incomplete national law has been
passed implementing directives, a national court can engage in
Marleasing-type construction of existing national law. Therefore,
prior to suing the State for damages, this route must be
169. Daniel Preiskel, Right of Action Against the State for Un-implemented EC
Directive: The Francovich Judgment, 20 INT'L. Bus. LAW. 294 (1992). See also,
Duffy, supra note 5, at 135; Szyszczak, supra note 35, at 697.
170. See Peter Duffy, Can You Sue the State to Get Your EC Rights?, THE
TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1991; but see Ross, supra note 9, at 58-60.
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exhausted. 17 1 The problem with this argument is that due to the
evolving jurisprudence of Marleasing, it could be risky for a
plaintiff to take her chance on the national court applying the
doctrine of indirect effect correctly. 172  Professor Ross argues that
there is no reason for removing a Francovich claim against the State
simply because there might be an indirect action against a private
party. The Francovich rule of Member-State liability "was
enunciated by the Court to be inherent in the Treaty and should thus
not be capable of being displaced by an alternative remedy. ,17
V. CONCLUSION
A question that arises from Francovich is whether its ruling
is circumscribed by directives, such as Directive 80/987, which
demand a high degree of State involvement in their execution.
Although the guarantee institutions set out in this Directive can be
financed by the employer, it can also be financed by the Member-
State. Further, the Member-States are required to set up the
guarantee institutions and lay down detailed rules for their
operation. Therefore, regardless of how the financing of the
guarantee institutions is set up, the State is always intimately
involved in the execution of the guarantee provided by the
Directive. This is not the case, for instance, with Directive 76/207,
the gender discrimination Directive, which does not require the
State to be as intimately involved with the execution of its guarantee
in situations where the State is not the employer. An argument can
171. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 9, at 59.
172. Id.
173. Therefore a plaintiff in this type of situation should have a "genuine choice
in the same way that he or she might in other matters of non-contractual liability
pursue any one of several joint defendants, but be only able to recover one sum
for the loss involved." Id.
19951
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
be made that the Francovich ruling only applies to those directives
which demand heavy state involvement in their execution.
This argument, however, does not appear to be valid. The
Court's ruling extends to all directives as long as they fulfill the
relatively simple test outlined by the Court: that they bestow fights
on individuals; that the content of these rights can be determined
from the directive itself; and that there is a causal link between the
state's conduct and the damage suffered by the individual. Whether
a directive has direct effect is irrelevant. The Court actually held
that Directive 80/987 lacked direct effect. In fact, according to the
Court, the Francovich ruling was particularly important to those
individuals who claim rights under directives which lack direct
effect. This is particularly true when a private party has suffered
loss vis-h-vis a third party as a result of a state's failure to
implement a directive. While an individual cannot claim rights
under an unimplemented directive against another because of the
lack of horizontal direct effect of directives, Francovich offers the
powerful solution of obtaining damages from the real culprit: the
Member-State which has failed to fulfill its Community obligations.
Under Francovich, an individual could enjoy her
Community rights whether she worked for the public or private
sector, without having to rely on the uncertain doctrine of indirect
effect. Further, national courts would not have to engage in the
tortuous analysis of who is a State employee and who is not.
Nevertheless, several problems are built into the Francovich ruling
which underscore its fragility and might help explain why the case
has been so favorably acclaimed in the academic community, but so
far has failed to create the avalanche of suits predicted by the Italian
Government. First, the facts of the case are extreme. As
Advocate-General Mischo pointed out, Italy's conduct was
"scandalous." Not only was there a prior Article 169 ruling finding
that Italy failed to comply with its duty to implement Directive
80/987, but years later, when Francovich was argued before the
Court of Justice, the Government had taken no steps toward
implementation. This poses the question of whether the Francovich
ruling is limited to cases where the State's misconduct is as blatant
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as here. The Advocate-General's opinion placed great emphasis on
the gravity of a State's conduct. Unfortunately, this part of his
opinion lacks clarity, and we are left wondering what test he
ultimately used to determine Member-State liability. The Court did
not engage in a thorough analysis of whether the gravity of the
State's conduct is a relevant factor in determining liability. The
Court merely stated that if a directive met the above referenced
three-pronged test, liability would attach. As long as a Member-
State violates its Community obligations and that breach injures
rights conferred by the Community, liability should attach
regardless of the degree of negligence by the State.
Another issue which remains unclear from the Francovich
ruling is whether a prior Article 169 ruling, finding non-compliance
with Community obligations, is necessary prior to a finding of
Member-State financial liability. The Advocate-General's opinion
is lamentably unclear on this issue. He seems to say that Article
169 findings are necessary when an individual is suing the State in
relationship to an unimplemented directive which lacks direct effect.
The Court is silent on the matter, but its statement that Member-
State liability is "inherent in the scheme of the Treaty" indicates that
a prior Article 169 ruling is unnecessary. This should be the
correct result. To tie Francovich causes of action to prior Article
169 rulings would rob Francovich of its effectiveness. This is
especially the case where individuals claim rights under directives
that lack direct effect. Francovich could not become an effective
substitute to the denial of horizontal effect if this requirement is
made. Further, individuals with Francovich-type causes of actions
cannot be required to exhaust other remedies simply because
national courts could embark on Marleasing-type construction of
national legislation. A Francovich litigant should be given the
opportunity of deciding whether she wants to sue for damages under
Francovich, or invoke a Community provision in a national court
and have the national judge engage in purposeful construction of
national law in light of a Community provision. Francovich could
be a very effective tool in protecting individual rights and in
correcting Member-State non-compliance with their Community
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obligations. Perhaps the most important result of the Francovich
ruling is that it could address many of the problems stemming from
the denial of horizontal direct effect of directives. Nevertheless,
Francovich's future effectiveness could be easily jeopardized by
imposing artificial barriers in the path of individuals seeking its
protection.
